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ABSTRACT
A major political issue in environmental policy of the Netherlands is the restriction
on and deposit of manure. The Dutch government has eventually chosen for heavy
and short term production limitation. The strict environmental policy has severe
impact on the production capabilities of Dutch farmers. Environmental restrictions
lead to major decreases of production capacity in agricultural sectors (hog-industry,
poultry etc.). The restrictions have several inducements: perceived environmental
deterioration (decline of biological diversity, acidity of soil, phosphates and nitrates;
84% of all nitrates in soil and water are caused by Dutch agriculture, and 88% of all
phosphates are caused by it (NMP31, 1998, based on 1995-situation).
Several strategies could be adopted to reduce environmental impacts:
- the use of environmental co-operatives;
- the use of tax and other financial incentives;
- the limitation of  production of manure by legislation;
- processing of manure into new agricultural inputs;
- reallocation of production and dispersing impacts;
The paper confronts the strategic aims of governmental bodies with the profit-seeking
behaviour (the opportunities and financial motivations) of major groups of
stakeholders in Dutch agriculture. The central question of this paper is: ‘To what
extent is the Dutch policy on manure control adequate with respect to strategic
alternatives that possibly exist?’. It tries to predict future development of Dutch
agriculture under the condition of growing (behavioural) environmental limitations.
The conclusion is that environmental co-operatives can facilitate changes in the
direction of sustainability in a decisive way.
1. Introduction: the Dutch manure problem
Attention on environmental issues has been drawn in The Netherlands after Word
War II. Before the 60’s, almost no limitations were created for business expansion and
pollution, the manure problem didn’t exist as a political item (Erisman & Monteny
1999). Expansion of livestock from the 50’s on caused severe problems for
environmental sustainability (Baarda 1999, Frouws, 1993). The problem of
concentration and growth of regional environmental influences, due to production on
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2large scale, is not a typical Dutch problem. For instance, hog production in North
Carolina (US) has increased from 5 million in 1990 to 16 million in 1997, with
devastating outcomes for soil and water quality (Innes, 2000).
Problems with respect to soil, water or air pollution, to which overproduction of
nitrogen, ammonia and phosphates (not absorbed by natural production in crops or
grasslands) contribute, made juridical interventions urgent. Not only pollution through
the abundant produce of manure came high on the political agenda in the ‘80’s.
Observed intrusions on soil quality from the chemical industry and newly discovered
highly contaminated sites from past business operations (for instance as to gas-
factories employed far before the Second World war) led to public awareness of
environmental deterioration.
Manure contributes to a more general problem of soil pollution, apart from the
different impacts on air and water. Soil pollution problems were heavily
underestimated at first instance. After the discovery of large chemical waste-dumps in
the early 80’s, a Temporary Soil Cleanup Act (1984) was proclaimed that vested
liability for carelessly creating soil pollution. Within a few years, estimated
retrospective clean-up costs mounted up to 100 billion Dutch guilders, leading to
excessive governmental claims on public as well as private institutions. With respect
to manure, 1984 was a landmark as well, because of the introduction of an Emergency
Law on the Limitation of Hog and Poultry Production, which confined intensive meat
production  (Baarda, 1999).
As to industrial soil pollution the impossibility to prove unlawful acts (by the lack of
clear governmental laws and policy) made necessary to adjust the Dutch law on Soil
Protection. The Dutch Soil Protection Act (SPA) of 1987 (adjusted in 1992), plays a
role in industrial as well as agricultural waste production. It aims at preventing soil
pollution by regulating its use. Its imposes several duties on the owner or user of soil:
- the necessity to take precautions;
- the duty to warn on accidents leading to or enlarging the danger of soil
pollution;
- the duty to clean-up after spoilage of hazardous substances.
Since 1992, it gives governmental agencies the possibility to proclaim liability on soil
pollution stemming from the past in situations in which the pollutant had been
careless, measured on accepted business practice at the time of cause and available
technical means (art. 75 of SPA). It gives in addition to governmental agencies the
instrument to order clean-up to owners or long-lease tenants, even if causality cannot
be proven or doesn’t exist (art. 43 SPA). It puts the blame for environmental impacts
even if the person who caused the intrusion on the environment cannot be found. The
‘polluter pays’ principle is omitted, thus creating the ability to prosecute.
The problem of contamination through manure surpluses is more volatile, it seems.
The primary objective of the SPA, since 1987, is prevention of environmental
pollution, from chemical as well as live-stock industry. It set standards on phosphate
deposits per ha of soil and stimulated industrial processing of manure. The standards
that were set in the ‘80’s were at a level where at the introduction no surplus of
natural fertilisers would exist. The reason for this was that the hog and poultry
production would be severely put into trouble if for legal reasons manure could not be
deposited anymore (Baarda, 1999). The permissive norms on manure deposit and
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The Netherlands comprise more than 100 million chicken, 17 chicken for each
inhabitant..
The Soil Pollution Act did not only limit the applicability of manure but also
restricted the possibilities to deposit in time and place, which in itself made necessary
extensive investments in storage capacity in sealed tanks, to prevent ammonia leaking
to the environment. In the period 1987-1990, serious efforts were made to limit the
manure problem and stabilise its environmental impacts through improved fodder
practices and distribution of manure (Baarda, 1999).
To limit environmental impacts, especially impacts on soil quality (saturation,
depending on the natural use of minerals versus the deposit of it), water and air
(ammonia leaching) a Law on Fertilisers was implemented in 1987. It regulates the
production of animal manure whereas the SPA regulates their usage (Frouws, 1999).
On the basis of the Law on Fertilisers, production quotation could be applied, farms
can be relocated to less vulnerable areas, manure could be processed into fertilisers
for internal use or for export. Financial retributions could be asked for setting op
plants for transforming manure into high-graded products, or for energy extraction
(Wiering, 1999).
The standards and the pace for elimination of the manure problem are themselves a
consequence of a shifting policy and awareness of environmental impact. On the basis
of the Law on Fertilisers a quotation system was applied that limited the amount of
phosphate produced and distributed by individual farms. It obliged farmers to keep
records of production of manure. In the ‘80’s the problem of manure was primarily
seen as a problem of processing (Frouws 1999). The possibilities to process are
dependent on the type of manure.
As manure deriving from poultry can efficiently be transformed into good quality dung for export,
poultry production is not severely influenced by a more restrictive policy on manure processing. With
poultry no severe limitations exist for exporting. Hog manure has two major disadvantages compared
with manure from the poultry industry. Industrial transformation or even transport cannot easily be
realised in a cost-efficient manner. And second directive 92/118/EG  limits the export of manure to
poultry and horses. So it is prohibited to export hog manure, for several obvious reasons, the main
being the possibility of exporting classical swine fever.
2. Shifting policies? From clean-up to prevention
The past centuries showed major changes in environmental policy with regard to
manure treatment in general, and especially with regard to agribusiness. Whereas in
the 60’s Manure Banks, for transportation and distribution of surpluses, were created,
in the 80’s experiments were carried out for manure processing. The final goal was to
create equilibrium between manure production and plant-usage, by systematically
reducing manure production to ecologically sustainable levels in 2000 (or, with the
delays that occur, during the ‘10’s). The governmental policy was heavily influenced
by pressure groups, well organised and settled in the agricultural landscape. The
‘alara’-principle  (‘as low as reasonably achievable’) was applied in a way that
significant reduction on production levels didn’t have to take place.
A major shift in governmental policy was caused by the occurrence of classical swine
fever in 1997, with devastating consequences for the Dutch swine production and
livestock. A law on the Restructuring of Hog production was passed, that limited the
rights for hog production. The rights for hog production replaced the manure
quotation system that was used, and will lead to a severe decline in the number of hog
farms. The bill was passed despite strong protests from farmers and their
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problem involved, but also on the basis of the EU Nitrogen directive. The standard set
by the European directive implies a maximum of 170 kg/ha of nitrogen in 2002, of
which The Netherlands would be in severe violation if extensive measures would not
be taken. Discongruent environmental standards are in violation with GATT-rules too
(GATT, 1961).
A 25% reduction of Dutch pig production is realised by buying the production rights
of farms. It is obvious tat the measures taken encounter continuous resistance. Four
factors, stemming from the past, contribute to the resistance governmental agencies
experience:
- continuous expansion of farms, leading to a smaller amount of farms with
substantial manure-quota and penalties for excess manure production;
- substantial investments as a result of the implementation of environmental
rules in stables, quota, fodder-procedures and soil insemination techniques
- debt financing by farmers for the reasons mentioned, that limits business
income and possibilities to turn-around business and reduce scale.
For some of the hog-farmers a production reduction will simply result in bankruptcy,
despite the financial compensation that is granted. It marks the change from
production adjustment to production limitation and choice for a different usage of
scarce soil resources.
3. Business operations and environmental management
Environmental measures have an impact on the business environment, just as the
business environment has an impact on natural surroundings. At the end of the 80’s
considerations were made as to what extend firms should be let the freedom of choice
for mitigating environmental impacts.
At the one side it was argued that only through control and coercion business would
have to be forced to make necessary changes. Environmental groups favoured mass-
balances, quotation and regular control of depositions by inspections of farms and
other firms. This position was taken by labour unions too and was nourished by public
indignation on environmental pollution (soil pollution in Lekkerkerk, waste on the
banks of the river IJssel in Holland, Uniser (1983)). On the other side, there was a
strong lobby by the employers in agribusiness and elsewhere for voluntary, self
induced measures to reduce environmental impact of business operations. To operate,
Dutch firms need an environmental permit or exemption. In 1992 the system that
provided the environmental permits changed drastically and put the environment (and
not only industrial development) in the centre of considerations. The principle of
environmental care and responsibility set the direction for industrial deployment. As
to soil pollution, sustainability meant the use of land in a way that future generations
would be able to use it again, for all possible purposes (multifunctionality). In course
of the 90’s it became clear that strong public influence on business affairs in industry
was not desirable:
- it leads to disproportionate effort of public agencies to account for and control
business operations;
- it leads to additional costs and additional tasks to perform, that are not
appropriate for governmental agencies (as to knowledge, goal and mission).
It’s peculiar that in industry the provision of mass balances and mineral-bookkeeping
is not prescribed, whereas in ‘normal’ Dutch agriculture a more strict system is
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taxes on surpluses of minerals produced. In general, end-of-pipe controls lack
sustainability and force their impact on management’s decision-making system.
For other sectors though, the implementation of environmental care systems was
promoted. At the beginning of the 90’s,  the intention was to force the implementation
of environmental care by means of legislation, for 12,000 firms. At the end of the
nineties, 300 industrial firms are indirectly coerced to implement environmental care.
The indirect motivation is by means of (and in accordance with principle no 10 of the
declaration of Rio de Janeiro and the ‘right-to-know’-legislation in the US) public
environmental reporting (ch. 12 of the Dutch Law on Environmental Care).
So in general:
- enforcement of environmental care in existing agricultural businesses is more
strict than in industry;
- The governmental choice is on coercion and production limitation, either
directly or indirectly by putting a price tag on pollution;
- ‘pollution prevention’ is preferred to ‘pollution control’.
The question was put central in this paper to what extent the choice for coercion and
production limitation ultimately benefits Dutch agricultural development. To give
insight in the relative benefits and disadvantages of the choices made, a more broad
spectrum of strategic options has to be described. The applicability of the choices
made ultimately depends on the desirability of the alternatives put aside.
3. Strategic options
The relationship between governmental agencies (advocating public goals on
reduction of environmental impacts) and business goals can include one or more of
the following elements (Bremmers, 1995):
- risk acceptance: accept environmental risks and their financial consequences
(deterioration of soil, penalties etc.)
- risk reduction: reduce the impact of business operations on the environment.
- risk compensation
Risk reduction can be realised by means of:
- implementation of environmental care
- investments in environmentally sound facilities and in R&D
- production and output limitations
Risk compensation can comprise:
- insurance
- compensation of losses through creation of reserves or provisions
3.1 Risk acceptance
The option of risk acceptance has been rejected, due to stringent European regulations
and a deteriorating environment. On the other side, the total abandonment of risks is
an illusion, since every activity has consequences for sustainable development.
3.2 Risk reduction options
The choice has been on risk reduction by elimination of the problem to a significant
extent. The emission of Nitrogen for 2000 and 2001 from 275 kg to 250 kg per ha per
year for grassland and from 150 to 125 kg for arable land (Bruil & Bezemer, 2000).
Till April 2000, about 1,600 Dutch hog farmers had shown willingness to sell their
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compensation.
Increased environmental care can be applied too. In the past significant efforts have
been made to decrease environmental impacts by investing in better feeding practices,
stables and depositing procedures. The implementation of norms for environmental
care on individual farms has to be supplemented by control-mechanisms and
facilitated by financial means. The lack of financial means, abundant possibilities to
evade monitoring and the lack of willingness and opportunities from farmers’
organisations in implementing financial care in their businesses is yet another
motivation to take coercive measures. The willingness to invest by the farmers is
strongly connected with perceived economic benefits of the measures taken.
Investments in environmental care are provided only if ‘pollution prevention pays’.
Payments consist of extra profits or a reduction in business risk or financial risk. The
elimination of environmental risk as such doesn’t seem to motivate for taking
environmental measures. Rewards, in a business context, stem form reduction of
inputs (use of animal feed for instance) or higher outputs. Higher outputs are only
realised if positive environmental impacts are translated in higher rewards for end-
products. Positive rewards can be created by means of fiscal and other financial
investments, like acceleration of depreciation. Although improvements in
environmental care could improve the competitive position of the industry (Withagen
1999), the perception of the impact of such measures is opposite to this.
Voluntary limitation of production of manure is a strategic option that is applied only
if reductions in output-farming are compensated:
- financially, by buying production rights;
- commercially, by increased output of complementary products.
The reduction as such doesn’t seem to benefit business goals, on the contrary.
Pollution prevention doesn’t pay by itself. The consequence is that the breaking-up of
trade-barriers leads to reallocation of resources world-wide. As to the hog-industry,
the pace of change has increased rapidly, due to the swine-fever catastrophe of 1997.
Processing of manure has not gained wide acceptance yet in the Netherlands. The
ultimate reduction of livestock, that takes place now, couldn’t have been necessary if,
and only if, in an early stadium serious efforts would have been made to transform
manure in valuable input. The hesitation on the side of the farmers will ultimately
work against them, it seems.
3.3 Risk compensation options
Insurance as an option for influencing manure impacts on the environment is not
appropriate since insurance presupposes uncertain future events. In the case of
manure uncertainty is of no relevance. The creation of provisions and reserves to
compensate damages is feasible either for two reasons: the lack of control, the
intransperancy of benefits and the lack of scale (compare: Svendsen et al, 1999).
At first glance it seems that the choice for coercive measures by the Dutch
government is the only way out of the marshland of animal deposits. The execution
however lacks the approval of agricultural organisations. Without such approval, the
basis for further improvement of environmental quality is lacking.
4. Conclusions
Environmental co-operatives are organisations that try to implement environmental
goals for the members that are involved. Environmental co-operatives can help in the
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intermediary at an environmental market. At the environmental market supply and
demand for environmental quality (Mighels & Hagelaar, 1994).  It serves the
environmental functions of farm-firms by means of:
- organisational change
- investment in control and mitigation of environmental impacts
- bargaining power in negotiations with governmental agencies.
The joining of an environmental co-operative means the opportunity and the duty to
come to an agreement on internal and external environmental goals. It limits the
strategic business opportunities. It can serve the goal of restricting environmental
outputs as well as counterpart in price-negotiations. Higher standards could influence
competitive power of farm-firms by creating strategic advantages
Increasingly, farmers employ ecologically sound side-activities to increase income.
Taking up such activities can reduce higher opportunity costs of land in use for
extensive livestock with higher value added, in tourist industry and preservation of
original landscapes.  Why not work together with farmer-organisations to gradually
transform the business in the direction of environmental sustainability and more
productivity than was feasible in the past?
Of course, limitations in output are inevitable to be sustainable. But to be able to
survive, intense working on common goals of governmental as well as farmer
organisations are necessary. The Dutch agricultural sector has shown in the past a lack
of togetherness and initiative to change the course of things. Only a reformulation of
private and public policies can help. The answer to the question set in this paper is
therefore: the recent policy lacks institutional embedding to connect shrinking with
growing in a more meaningful way. One way, not exhausted, out of the dark manure
tunnel is by means of environmental co-operatives.
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